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Plato on the Souls of Beasts
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Eve Browning Cole 
University of Minnesota, Duluth
SAGP Central, Chicago; April 26, 1991
What, according to Plato, are the most significant differences 
between human beings and non-human animals? Among ancient Greek 
thinkers who devoted themselves to the project of explaining human 
nature and reflecting on the peculiarities of human existence, 
Plato would seem to have been particularly well-placed to render a 
clear and decisive distinction between humans and beasts. For his 
emphasis on the centrality of reason in human life, and his 
repeatedly articulated faith in the immortality of the human soul, 
would appear to mark humans off from other animals once and for 
all. And there are certainly passages within the dialogues which 
seem to imply that Plato is secure in such distinctions. For
example, in the etymology of άνθρωπος in Cratvlus. we find the 
following;
The name "human being" (άνθρωπος) means this: the other 
animals (τα μέν άλ λ α  θ η ρ ί α ) do not reflect on or analyze 
or look up to (άναθρεί) that which they see; but a human 
being no sooner sees something - that is, observes it 
(δπωπε), than he looks up at and reflects on that which 
he has seen. Thus the human being alone is rightly 
called άνθρωπος, looking up at what is seen (άναθρών a 
δπωπε). (Crat.399CÍ-6)
Beneath the befuddling glitziness of this etymology there lies a
substantive philosophical claim: that for humans, perception is an
occasion for reflection and further inquiry, "looking up" from the
perceived object to the conceptual framework into which it will
fit; for "the other animals", however, the mere seeing is the end
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of the mental process. On such a foundation, a clear distinction 
between humans and non-human animals based on their cognitive 
capacities could be readily constructed.
However, a survey of the Platonic texts which deal directly 
with the "soul of the beast" yields some material which may 
complicate the clarity of this bifurcation. This potentially 
complicating material is of several different varieties: (1) Some
passages seem to ascribe to non-human animals cognitive and moral 
capabilities which are human-like; (2) In discussing the 
transmigration of the soul, Plato seems ready to countenance human- 
to-animal and animal-to-human transits; and (3) Plato repeatedly 
states that certain human lives are beast-like or (worse still) are 
actually beast's lives (whatever this may mean). In this paper I 
will explore the complicating text-groups of types (1) and (3) 
above, hoping to achieve some clarity on Plato's general position 
regarding the affinities and distances between the human and the 
beast.1 The value of such a project lies ultimately in its 
potential for illuminating Plato's view of human nature itself, and 
of our place in the natural world at large.
Section I: Courageous and Clever Beasts?
In the Laches. no finally satisfactory definition of courage 
is found. But the most promising candidate provokes a brief 
controversy regarding the moral horizons of beasts, and so deserves 
our attention. The promising candidate definition is offered by 
Nicias, according to whom "courage is knowledge ( ε π ι σ τ ή μ η ) of what
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is to be dreaded and dared" (Lach.196d). Socrates immediately 
points out that if this is true, then either (a) no non-human 
animal can have courage; or (b) non-human animals can be wise to a 
degree rare even in human beings (since true courage has been 
admitted to be rare) . The counter-intuitive aspect of (a) is 
brought out by Socrates at 196e: If Nielas is correct, then
"...necessarily the lion and the deer and the bull and the monkey 
seem to have an equal share of inborn natural courage" (i.e., none 
at all). And Laches, at this point in the dialogue disgruntled and 
apparently tired, chimes in to stress the improbability of 
conceding (a) ? he claims that "everybody agrees" (πάντες 
όμολογουμενον, 197a) certain animals are courageous. The
universality of this agreement is reiterated at 197c.
Nicias embraces option (a) , and states that while true courage 
is indeed rare, many beings display a thoughtless lack of fear 
which might be confused with courage; "... rashness, boldness, and 
fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great 
number of men, women, children, and animals" (197b). He suggests 
that this heedless boldness be called θρασέα and thus distinguished 
from proper courage (ανδρεία). Significantly, he makes no move to 
distinguish this thoughtless boldness as it is displayed by humans 
from the ways it is displayed by the animals. Thus the implication 
of his claim is to establish a form of courage-like behavior which 
links humans and non-human animals.
The subsequent stages of the argument, in which Nicias' 
definition of courage is shown to entail the whole of virtue and
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perhaps even omniscience, need not concern us here. It is
important to note, however, that both Socrates and Laches appear to 
be somewhat surprised that Nicias is willing to so summarily 
dismiss the idea of a courageous beast, and to accept the 
implication that all animals are thus alike in courage (i.e.,
utterly lacking in it). The association of the lion with courage, 
and the deer with timorousness, is firm in Greek literature from 
Homer on, and Laches' emphatic and repeated assertion that courage 
is universally granted to (some) animals is testimony to
significant popular sentiment in this direction.2
In Republic, the kind of courage required of the citizens in 
the ideal city is denied to slaves (or slave-like natures) and to 
beasts (or beast-like natures; I will explain this ambiguity 
below), on the grounds that this courage requires firm right 
opinion (όρθβ δ ό ξ α, 430b) produced by education. A looser and more 
precarious form of right opinion can be found in "the nature of a 
beast and a slave" (. . . θ η ρ ι  ώδη καί άν£ρα7το6ώ£η...) , but will not 
enable them to display courage.
Numerous translators, including Shorey, Cornford, Grube,
Stirling & Scott, and Larson, render the ambiguous phrase "the 
nature of a beast and a slave" more simply as "a beast or a 
slave". They thus embrace the implication that beasts and slaves 
can have right opinion of the looser and more precarious form. 
This would be a rather startling concession to the non-human 
animal's cognitive capabilities, though far less odd for the slave. 
Fortenbaugh has argued against the majority translation.
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maintaining that the looser right opinion in question is restricted 
to humans only, that we should translate the key phrase "slavish 
and bestial", and that "'Bestial' is used as a pejorative label and 
nothing more".3 Here I am inclined to agree with Fortenbaugh, 
given Plato's normal usage of the term θ η ρ ι ώδ η ς (of which more 
below in section II) . Thus this Republic passage gives us no 
reason to suppose that Plato and Nicias were in disagreement 
concerning animal courage.
A passage from Laws. however, does. At Laws 963a, the 
Athenian Stranger refers to a form of courage in which both beasts 
and children participate. For "...a courageous soul comes into 
being without reasoning and by nature (ανευ... λόγου και φύσει). 
This aspect of courage is to be contrasted with intelligence and 
practical wisdom, which do not appear in the absence of reasoning. 
Elsewhere in Laws (710a-b), we find reference to a kind of natural 
temperance (σωφροσύνη) which also is said to occur naturally in 
beasts and children. This virtue if it exists in isolation from 
other virtues is said to be of little worth. However, if beasts 
are naturally courageous and naturally temperate, their moral 
profile is not negligibly low. To add one more element to this 
profile, we should note that, also in Laws. animals who mate for 
life are praised for leading lives which are "holy and just, 
remaining faithful to their first contracts of friendship" (840d- 
e). And, here as elsewhere in Laws, a moral lesson for humans is 
drawn from this observation about animal behavior. The citizens 
must be able to be at least as chaste as such beasts.4 5
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As to the cognitive capacities of non-human animals, though 
Plato nowhere explores them systematically, we can again locate 
passages which speak to the ascription of certain human-like 
cognitive traits to animals. Thus a possibly humorous comment by 
the Eleatic Stranger in the Politicus hesitantly ascribes φρόνιμος 
to the crane, in order to make the critical comment that cranes 
would probably divide the life-world into cranes and everyone else, 
just as the Stranger and Young Socrates have just divided it into 
humans and everyone else (263c-d) .5 And in Republic. we find an 
undoubtedly humorous reference to the philosophical nature of the 
dog; insofar as dogs are unfriendly to strangers but fawn on those 
they are familiar with, their "criterion of the friendly and the 
alien is intelligence and ignorance" (376b-c) .6 For this they 
deserve to be considered philosophical and lovers of learning!
In spite of the fact that this appears to be whimsical, the 
comparison of the guardians to dogs in Republic is sustained and 
striking.
Thus we see that, while Laches remains rather ambiguous as to 
animal courage, and Republic demonstrates pretty flat opposition to 
the idea with only humorous intimations of animal intelligence. 
Laws evidences definite sympathy toward the beast as a moral being 
of courage and temperance, with perhaps even some lessons to teach 
humans about living good lives. We could explain this in a variety 
of ways. First, one might suggest that the Athenian Stranger of 
Laws is not to be identified with Plato's own philosophical outlook 
even as closely as we tend to identify the Socrates of Republic
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with that outlook (however closely that should ideally be). Thus, 
the mellower picture of the non-human animal glimpsed in Laws might 
just be a dramatic feature of the Stranger"s persona. rather than 
a departure by Plato from a former mindset about animals. 
Alternatively, we might note the fact that other shifts of emphasis 
are represented in Laws. with its apparently greater interest in 
the non-rational aspects of human nature (the drinking education, 
the motions for infants, etc.)? perhaps Plato is here relaxing 
somewhat his strictures on the close connection between virtue and 
reason. And finally, it is tempting to speculate about an 
Aristotelian influence on Plato's view of animals, at this late 
stage of Plato's philosophical career.
But also, it is important to note that Plato's earlier 
negativity about animals may have been in part a product of a 
polemical situation in the Athenian philosophical scene. For 
positive references to animal behavior in nature were a feature of 
certain sophists' agendas. The views which Callicles advances in 
Gorgias (481c ff.), according to which "natural" goodness (the 
exercise of strength and force to obtain what one desires) is 
explicitly modelled on animal analogies, are importantly 
representative.7 This sort of view is parodied by Aristophanes in 
Clouds, when Pheidippides justifies beating his father by reference 
to the "chickens and other animals" who fight with their parents 
(1427-1429). He concludes his argument, "And what difference is
them and us, except that they don'tthere between 
resolutions? "8
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I believe that Plato*s earlier disinclination to credit 
animals with moral attributes or cognitive abilities may well be in 
part a reaction to what he viewed as the excesses of the "Nature 
School" in his intellectual milieu. He distances himself from this 
school, and from its understanding of the relation between nature 
and human life, even more decisively when he describes the 
bestialization of the human soul, a topic to which we now turn.
Section II: The Beast in Human Shape
To counterbalance thé above hints at animal cognition and 
virtue there are many fiercely negative comments about beasts in 
the Platonic corpus, and the very phrase ώσπερ θηρίον functions as 
a scathing insult. Beasts are repeatedly characterized as the 
grossest of hedonists, who would vote unanimously for pleasure as 
the highest good (Philebus 67b), and who live to stuff themselves 
with food and drink (Laws!83le). The susceptibility of "snakes, 
tarantulas, scorpions, and other beasts" to magic spells or charms 
is used in a complex way at Euthvdemus 290a to insult speech- 
writers. A human soul which is aware of its ignorance and not 
disturbed by it is "indifferently wallows in the mire of ignorance 
like a pig" (Rep. 535e). The person who pursues physical training 
to the exclusion of intellectual development becomes a "hater of 
arguments", or "misologist", who then abjures persuasion and lives 
"by force and in wildness like a beast" (Rep. 411d). And 
Thrasymachus, in his famous initial outburst at 336b, is of course 
described as ώσπερ θτγρίον. 8
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The effect of this use of animals to deprecate certain forms 
of human behavior and character is twofold: first, certain aspects 
of the nature of the beast are highlighted for scorn (pig's 
wallowing, snakes' susceptibility to charmers, many animals' 
evident enjoyment of their meals, etc.); but secondly, the scorned 
behaviors are located within the human domain, which moves the 
human and the non-human animal into closer relationship. As they 
are, so are some of us. Paradoxically, Plato's minatory use of 
animal analogies to deplore certain human tendencies brings the 
beast nearer our doorstep, as it were. But at times Plato goes 
further than this, and actually moves the beast indoors.
Plato makes a more elaborate use of the moral charge of 
"beastliness" ( θηρ ι ώδης ) than any other ancient Greek writer. This 
is perhaps in part due to the fact that the term seems to have 
become adaptable for this sort of semantic work only around the 
third quarter of the fifth century.9 However this may be, Plato's 
interest in beastliness as a human condition is notable. We should 
not make light of the fact that, of Plato's mythic depictions of 
the human soul, the two most powerful and sustained intimately 
involve non-human animals: Phaedrus with its charioteer and mixed 
equine team, and Republic with its psychic menagerie of "many- 
headed beast", lion, and tiny inner person. And while Platonic 
myths cannot be treated as literal descriptions, neither of course 
can they be dismissed as poetic fancies.
The human condition at its best, according to Plato, is to be 
envisioned as the successful domestication of an inner beast or
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group of them.10 This domestication is at times described as a
difficult and violent process? thus in Phaedrus it involves
bloodshed and pain, in Republic aggression and danger.11 The human
condition at its worst entails the triumph of the inner beast over
the element which should be in control, and is thus a
bestialization of the person.
Plato describes this bestialization in a variety of ways. In
Politicus. it is said that a courageous soul in the absence of the
truth is inclined towards beastliness (άποκλίvei...προς θ η ρ ι ώδ η ,
3 09e2-3). In Laws. a poor or defective education is said to make
a person into the wildest of animals.
The human being is, as we say, tame; and just as when he 
gets a correct education and has a fortunate nature he 
becomes the divinest and tamest of animals, if he is not 
sufficiently or not well trained he becomes the wildest 
of all things that live on the earth. (766a)
Later in Laws, while discussing legislation against verbal abuse
the Stranger states that such language has a bestializing effect on
its user. The part of the soul which was "tamed by education, is
once again made wild", and the verbal abuser "having been
bestialized ( θ η ρ ιούμενος) lives in ill-temper" (935a).
From both these passages we can see that the tameness or
gentleness of the human being is an achievement, a result of
education; and it is eminently reversible. The human, unlike the
beast, achieves its true nature only at great expense of effort?
also unlike the beast, whose nature is diachronically stable, the
human can lose the most valuable portion of its nature, its highest
humanity, through weakness, settled vice, or even just a
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prematurely terminated education.
In the Republic’s interior zoo,12 even the individual beasts 
can become further bestialized; thus the interior lion can become 
a monkey under the influence of a disposition to flattery and 
slavishness (59 0b ; cf. Phaedrus 24 0b on the flatterer as a terrible 
beast and great harm). This reminds us that the beasts within do 
not function simply as negative elements to be suppressed as far as 
possible. The best human life will first domesticate, then nourish 
these beasts in the best way possible; the small interior person in 
Republic is described as caring for his beasts like a farmer tends 
his plants ( e w i μ ε λ η σ ε τ α ι ώσπερ γεωργός, 589b). Thus their
animality is part of the whole creature's full humanity.
What actually is the difference between a depraved, ill- 
educated, verbally abusive, rancorous, greedy, and incontinent 
human being, on the one hand, and a wild animal, on the other? One 
is first tempted to say that the wild animal is much to be 
preferred, aesthetically and morally; and it can hardly be denied 
that in some of Plato ' s comparisons between depraved humans and 
beasts, the latter suffer an injustice. But the question requires 
a more serious consideration. Plato ' s conception of the human soul 
sharpens the question to a definite intensity, for he is both 
uniquely liberal in his use of anima1-ana1ogies for parts of the 
human soul and uniquely intense in his commitment to the essential 
importance of irai Se v a in constructing and maintaining a properly 
human, non-bestial character.
It is tempting to answer that, no matter how depraved the
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life, in a human soul there remain the uniquely human elements 
(tiny person, charioteer) which are in principle capable of 
resuscitation and restoration to power. However, the force of 
Plato's language in describing the struggle by which their hegemony 
is achieved in the virtuous soul leads us to countenance the 
possibility, even the probability, of their indefinitely enduring 
defeat in at least some lives. In case of defeat, the human is the 
moral equivalent of the beast and perhaps even wilder (Laws 766a, 
808d-e, 874e-875a).
Conclusions:
We have seen that although Plato's emphasis on rationality and 
calculative reason, along with his faith in the soul's immortality, 
place him well to mark a clear-cut distinction between the human 
and the beast, that clear distinction is somewhat difficult to 
locate. While there is no strong evidence that Plato was inclined 
to attribute human-like cognitive capabilities to animals, the 
absence of extended textual engagements with animal cognition make 
this an uncertain issue. And in the moral domain, there do seem to 
be texts which suggest that a kind of natural virtue may be found 
among animals. These appear in the Laws. and are counterbalanced 
by earlier denials of those same virtues to the non-human soul. 
But most interestingly, Plato's descriptions of the inner dynamics 
and characteristic moral failures of the human soul bring humans 
and beasts into affinity. Plato's emphasis on the precariousness 
of the genuinely human condition, on its artifactual nature and the
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necessity of constant vigilance lest the beast within break its 
bonds and run to supremacy, have the implication that the clear 
distinction between human and beast which the Cratvlus etymology 
signals is itself a result, an achievement, and an ideal. It is in 
effect a difficult process, rather than a naturally given 
condition. For Plato, human nature must be won, and won again.
Notes:
1. I postpone dealing with the doctrine(s) of transmigration for 
the present.
2. See Urs Dierauer, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike? 
Amsterdam: Grüner, 1977; for Homer, see especially pp.6-15.
3. W.W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion; p.66 note 1.
4. At Laws 814a-b, the Stranger states that citizen women will 
need some physical and military training, so that they can defend 
their children if attacked during wartime when the male military 
forces are absent; they must be "like those birds who will fight 
the most powerful of beasts in defense of their children", and not 
just run straight to the temples for refuge.
5. J. B. Skemp, in his translation with commentary of the 
Statesman. devotes a very colorful footnote filled with interesting 
crane-lore to this passage; see The Statesman. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1952, pp. 133-4.
6. For a discussion of this passage see T.A.Sinclair, "Plato's 
Philosophic Dog"; Classical Review 62 (1948) 61-2. Sinclair takes 
the joke to be at the expense of the "Nature School" of sophists 
who drew recommendations for human behavior and social policy from 
the domain of non-human animals. I think this line of 
interpretation is correct here and will also apply it below to 
Plato's more scathing comments about the souls of beasts and their 
defects.
7. See W.K.C. Guthrie, The Sophists. Cambridge University Press, 
1971; pp.101-107 on Callicles as a cultural representative; see 
also Arthur 0. Lovejoy and George Boas, Primitivism and Related 
Ideas in Antiquity. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1935, ch.III, 
"Genesis of the Conception of Nature as Norm", and ch.XIII, "The 
Superiority of the Animals".
8. Aristophanes, Lvsistrata and Other Plavs; tr. Alan H. 
Sommerstein; Penguin, 1973; p.170.
9. This philological point is compellingly argued by Michael J.
O'Brien in "Xenophanes, Aeschylus, and the Doctrine of Primeval 
Brutishness"; Classical Quarterly 35 (1985), 264-277; see
especially pp.266-8.
10. The contrast between "tame" or "gentle" (ήμερος) and "wild" 
(άγριος) runs throughout the Republic's description of the soul's 
three components (588b ff.); virtue consists in the domination and 
taming of the beasts by the little person. They are to become 
friendly one another and subordinate to him - 589b. Phaedrus tells 
of the "humbling" of the unruly horse (it is ταπεινωθείς by the 
harsh reining of the charioteer, 254e7), and of its "enslavement",
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256b2.
11. Phaedrus: the unruly horse is repeatedly brought to his knees,
tongue and jaws bloodied by the bit? 254e. Republic: the beasts 
within fight one another, bite and eat one another? 589a. The
lowest one, with its many heads, is "terrible, huge, and 
multiform"? 590e.
12. The description of the soul at Rep.588c ff. prompts Shorey to 
one of his more delightfully unrestrained footnotes, in which a 
quantity of poetry about inner beasts is collected, culminating in 
Carl Sandburg: "Ο, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs!". 
Shorey charges Sandburg with "nimeity" even while illustrating it 
himself!
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